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Abstract: Based on a research project comprising data from an interview study and a survey with 
teachers and school principals in four German federal states (Bundesländer), this paper questions the 
claim that the side effects of accountability in education are bound to high-stakes contexts, and also 
provides evidence of side effects occurring in no- and low-stakes contexts. The findings suggest that 
side effects cannot be fully explained by certain implementation features of accountability regimes 
(e.g. high stakes), but should rather be understood as a result of implementation features as well as 
Education Policy  Analysis Archives Vol. 25 No. 93      SPECIAL ISSUE 2 
 
systematic effects of accountability in education.  
Keywords: policy analysis; accountability; high stakes tests; comparative study 
 
Repensando los efectos secundarios de la rendición de cuentas en la educación. Resultados 
de un estudio múlti-métodos en cuatro sistemas de la escuela alemana 
Resumen: Basado en un proyecto de investigación que comprende datos de entrevistas y encuestas 
con profesores y directores de escuelas en cuatro Estados federados (Bundesländer), este trabajo 
cuestiona la afirmación de que los efectos secundarios de rendición de cuentas en educación están 
limitados a contextos de gran repercusión (high-stakes) y también proporciona evidencias de efectos 
secundarios que ocurren en contextos de baja o sin repercussion (low-stakes). Los resultados 
sugieren que los efectos secundarios no pueden explicarse completamente por ciertas características 
de la aplicación de los regímenes de rendición de cuentas por ejemplo de gran repercusión, pero debe 
entenderse más bien como ambos: como resultado de características de implementación y como 
efectos sistemáticos de rendición de cuentas en la educación. 
Palabras-clave: Análisis de la política; rendición de cuentas; pruebas de gran repercusión; estudio 
comparativo 
 
Repensando efeitos colaterais de responsabilização/accountability na educação. Resultados 
de um estudo multi-métodos em quatro sistemas escolares alemães 
Resumo: Baseado em um projeto de pesquisa que abrange dados de entrevistas e questionários com 
professores e diretores de escolas em quatro unidades da federação alemã (Bundesländer), este texto 
questiona a alegação de que os efeitos colaterais de responsabilização/accountability na educação 
estão vinculados aos contextos onde há sançoes (high-stakes) e também traz evidências dos efeitos 
que ocorrem em contextos com menores ou sem consequencias (low-stakes). Os resultados sugerem 
que efeitos colaterais não podem ser totalmente explicados por certas características de 
implementação de regimes de responsabilidade, por exemplo, high-stakes, mas antes devem ser 
entendidos como ambos: como resultado de características de implementação e como efeitos 
sistemáticos de responsabilização na educação. 




Side effects are frequently observed phenomena in the Anglo-American discussion on 
accountability in education. In surveying the literature, one can identify an entire set of “unintended 
consequences” (Jones, Jones, & Hargrove, 2003) or “collateral damage” (Nichols & Berliner, 2007) 
of such systems. The phenomena described range from different forms of behavior such as the 
infamous “teaching to the test”, “cheating” or “cream skimming” to a variety of side effects referring 
to teacher attitudes, such as “erosion of trust” or “deprofessionalization”. Based on literature 
reviews, Bellmann and Weiß (2009) and de Wolf and Janssens (2007) both present lists of such side 
effects. 
In the Anglo-American discussion, side effects are usually associated with the existence of 
high stakes (Abrams, Pedulla, & Madaus, 2003; Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Mintrop, 2004). One of the 
best-known examples of high-stakes accountability is the No Child Left Behind Act (No Child Left 
Behind [NCLB], 2002), whose system of incentives and sanctions is blamed for numerous side 
effects (Baker et al., 2010; Ravitch, 2016). This has recently been confirmed by the Committee on 
Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Public Education, which has reviewed various test-
based incentive programs (Hout & Elliott, 2011). Some research projects have even attempted to 
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establish a direct link between the level of high-stakes pressure and the dissemination of side effects 
in certain federal states (Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2005; Pedulla et al. 2003). 
In the aftermath of PISA 2000, the German federal states (Bundesländer) established 
accountability measures in their education systems, following developments in the United States and 
Great Britain. However, because the experiences with high-stakes accountability in these countries 
repeatedly served as a ‘cautionary tale’ (Böttcher, 2012), accountability measures were introduced in 
the German federal states without linking high stakes to those measures. Thus, accountability 
regimes in German federal school systems can be characterized as no- and low-stakes contexts. In 
high-stakes contexts, consequences in the form of rewards or sanctions are linked to evaluation 
results. In no-stakes contexts, evaluation results serve as descriptive information only (Nichols & 
Berliner 2007; Ryan & Feller 2009). Concerns that the implementation of tests for the purpose of 
feedback and comparison, without positive or negative consequences, may be associated with side 
effects are countered in Germany with the remark that side effects are only a problem of high stakes 
(Blömeke, 2004). In short, until now, side effects have not been considered a noteworthy problem, as 
long as high stakes are not introduced. As a result, the question of whether the side effects of 
accountability systems in education can also be observed under conditions of no-stakes or low-stakes 
has received almost no attention (Jäger, 2012). 
Despite all variations, accountability systems are essentially about the combination of 
instruments of standards-based accountability (educational standards, standards-based testing, school 
inspections) and choice policies (school autonomy, extended options in school choice, enhanced 
competition through private schools) (e.g. Betebenner, Howe, & Foster, 2005; Wells & Holme, 
2005). This combination is expected to produce significant impulses for quality development in the 
education system. Both groups of instruments provide feedback for schools, informing them about 
their performance level (in comparison to other schools), either bureaucratically through standards-
based tests and inspections or through market signals. Such feedback can serve as an information 
basis for teachers and principals in decision-making and may be understood as an incentive to 
enhance performance simultaneously. For many participants in educational policy, this combination 
of standards-based accountability and choice policies ranks as a blueprint for successful school 
systems. According to a White Paper of the Department for Education in the UK (DfE, 2010), the 
most innovative and high-performing school systems are those which combine high levels of 
autonomy for both teachers and schools with high levels of accountability. 
The implementation of standards-based accountability and choice policies in Germany’s 
federal states without the introduction of high stakes provides a good opportunity to question the 
claim that side effects are a matter of high stakes only. The research project ‘Unintended Effects of 
Accountability in the School System’ (acronym Nefo), funded by the German Ministry of Education 
and Research (BMBF), examined side effects in no- and low-stakes contexts of four German federal 
states. An interview study with 101 teachers and principals and a survey with 2637 respondents in 
Berlin, Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Thuringia were conducted. Contrary to the 
expectation that side effects do not pose a substantial problem in no- and low-stake contexts, the 
findings of the Nefo project indicate that side effects are a serious issue. The findings suggest that 
the side effects of accountability are not only a matter of high stakes and therefore a matter of 
implementation characteristics of the accountability systems introduced, but should be understood as 
systematic effects. To clarify and validate these assumptions, the paper proceeds as follows:  
In the first part, we outline the theoretical concept of side effects. We then present our 
approach of studying side effects. Subsequently, we introduce a list of side effects that includes both 
side effects known from the Anglo-American discussion of accountability in education and 
supplementary phenomena indicated by teachers in the interview study of the Nefo project. We also 
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comment on some side effects in the list. In the following section, we describe some results of our 
survey study. These results suggest that a distinction between adaptive behavior (according to 
incentives) and evasive behavior (contrary to incentives) is advantageous for studying side effects of 
accountability in education. The paper concludes with propositions of how to explain the occurrence 
of side effects of accountability in education and with suggestions for further research. 
Theoretical Concept 
To discuss the problematic effects of accountability in education, a wide variety of concepts 
is introduced in the literature, e.g. side effects, unintended consequences, undesirable outcomes, 
external effects, unintentional effects and “effets pervers” (van Thiel & Leeuw, 2003, p. 271), each 
with different implications for how phenomena are classified as side effects.  
To clarify the understanding of side effects in this paper, the distinction between intention 
and function is crucial. As McLaughlin (2002) points out, functional approaches prescind from 
intentionality and focus on functions to explain social phenomena. Concepts such as unintended 
consequences, undesirable outcomes and unintentional effects suggest the existence of definable 
intentions. The study of side effects with reference to intentions rests on two assumptions: (1) events 
such as the introduction of accountability systems in education can be traced back to an identifiable 
person or group of persons and (2) it is possible to identify these individuals’ or group’s intentions 
validly and reliably. Thus, before observable phenomena can be classified as unintended 
consequences, undesirable outcomes or unintentional effects, the intentions associated with 
establishing accountability need to be identified. Such an attempt encounters severe problems. 
Usually, multiple actors play a part in policy making, thus different intentions might be associated 
with one policy. Tackling this issue, one faces the problem of “re-intentionalizing” certain effects, 
meaning that effects are viewed as intended only in retrospect.  
Concepts such as external effects, “effets pervers” and side effects elude such problems. 
Instead of identifying side effects in relation to intentions, the (ascribed) function of an activity or of 
an institutional arrangement can be used to classify observable phenomena. Following official 
statements from policy makers, the function of accountability in education can be summarized as 
enhancing the quality of education, which is usually specified in terms of efficiency and equity 
(Woessmann & Schuetz, 2006). In a nutshell, accountability in education is expected to directly and 
efficiently enhance the results of educational systems while simultaneously advancing educational 
equality. Therefore, side effects can be defined as those effects that are in some way dysfunctional 
for enhancing the quality of education (Ehren & Visscher, 2006). The task for researchers studying 
side effects is thus to demonstrate how and why an effect might adversely affect efficiency and 
equity.  
While the above-mentioned considerations apply to the research on side effects in general, 
previous approaches to side effects allow conclusions for a theory of side effects specific for 
accountability in education. As early as 1964, Etzioni outlined certain problems when it comes to 
measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations:  
Most organizations under pressure to be rational are eager to measure their efficiency. 
Curiously, the very effort – the desire to establish how we are doing and to find ways 
of improving if we are not doing as well as we ought to – often has quite undesired 
effects from the point of view of the organizational goals. Frequent measuring can 
distort the organizational efforts because, as a rule, some aspects of its output are 
more measurable than others. Frequent measuring tends to encourage over-
production of highly measurable items and neglect of less measurable ones. (p. 9) 
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Especially in the case of organizations with vague goals, such as schools, “the distortion 
consequences of over-measuring are larger when it is impossible or impractical to quantify the more 
central, substantive output of an organization” (p. 9). According to Etzioni (1964), three insights can 
be gained for a theory of accountability side effects in education: First, side effects do not necessarily 
emerge from a “wrong” way of dealing with accountability instruments by actors such as teachers; 
instead, accountability systems might rather be systematically associated with the risk of producing 
side effect. Second, side effects come into play not only when actors try to avoid pressure that is 
associated with performance measurement (as it is the case with different forms of “cheating”, 
“window dressing” and “cream skimming”), but also when they learn how to adapt their behavior to 
the measured demands. In doing so, non-measured demands face a high risk of losing importance in 
everyday practice (as it is the case for different forms of “reallocation”, “coaching” and” myopia”) 
(van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). Third, it is necessary to take into account that the introduction of 
performance indicators in organizations characterized by so-called ill-defined problems bares a high 
risk. This is especially true for professional behavioral contexts that are hallmarked by both an 
orientation towards vaguely defined societal target values and a high degree of uncertainty, as is the 
case with practice in schools (Frey & Osterloh, 2006; Hopmann, 2003; Levin, 1998).  
Another substantial contribution to a theory of side effects of performance indicators and 
feedback systems stems from Campbell (1975), who describes side effects as phenomena of 
corruption. He describes the social mechanism underlying side effects as follows:  
The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the 
more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort 
and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor. (p. 35) 
 
Corruption can be differentiated at this point; on the one hand, corruption can be used with 
reference to indicators. The indicators operationalizing quality can lose their validity as soon as actors 
narrow their performances to the defined indicators. Koretz (2005) points to this when he speaks of 
score inflation in the course of standards-based accountability (Hout & Elliott, 2011). On the other 
hand, one can identify the corruption of actors. The introduction of performance indicators can lead 
to a restructuring of an individual motivation in the sense that the intrinsic motivation based on 
professional beliefs is crowded out in favor of external rewards or commands (Frey, 2012). This is 
especially true if the individuals affected perceive the intervention as controlling (Deci, 1971; Frey, 
2012). 
Following Campbells’ theorizing of side effects as corruption, Nichols and Berliner (2005) 
describe the side effects of accountability systems in education as “corruption of indicators and 
educators”. But contrary to Campbell, they regard the occurrence of high stakes linked to 
performance results as the fundamental cause of the production of side effects. Unfortunately, this 
supports the assumption that high stakes are the ultimate reason for the appearance of side effects, 
instead of taking into account that side effects might be associated systematically with performance 
measurement as a means of quality assessment. Literature and research from Germany, as well as 
research conducted in the Anglo-American context, commonly narrow the discussion on side effects 
to the issue of high stakes, which leaves limited room for both alternative explanations and the 
development of a general theory of side effects. As early as 1956, Ridgway suggested not only 
concentrating on indicators that entail serious consequences for all stakeholders, but also to consider 
the “dysfunctional consequences of performance measurement” (p. 240), even when performance 
measurement is used only to obtain feedback and information.  
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In order to elaborate on the distinction between side effects as a corruption of indicators and 
of educators, the approach of van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) can be adopted. Referring to a broad 
sample of empirical studies, they observe a “performance paradox” (p. 271) when it comes to 
measuring performance. For them, the term “performance paradox” addresses a weak correlation 
between performance indicators and actual performance. Even though van Thiel and Leeuw focus 
only on side effects as the corruption of indicators in their approach, they do point out that side 
effects can come into play either unintentionally or deliberately. Thus, van Thiel and Leeuw 
distinguish between an “unintended performance paradox” (p. 272) and a “deliberate performance 
paradox” (p. 274). While the unintended performance paradox is basically related to insufficient or 
imprecise accountability requirements, the deliberate performance paradox represents forms of 
behavior that are very close to sabotage in an attempt to raise performance. In their view, the 
deliberate performance paradox presupposes the unintended performance paradox. 
Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) consider the side effects of accountability in education to be a 
problem of shortcomings in performance measurement. For them, the occurrence of side effects is 
therefore caused by minimal accountability requirements, the elusiveness of policy objectives, goals 
that are unquantifiable and thus hard to measure, and a strong emphasis on monitoring and 
efficiency within organizations. The crucial problem of accountability in public sector provision is 
seen as the absence of appropriate and valid performance indicators “that minimize the 
dysfunctional effects and maximize functional effects” (p. 277). According to the intentional 
paradigm, they do not consider the possibility that problematic effects might be systematically linked 
to accountability systems. As a result, a rather normative perspective is applied that entails the danger 
of focusing solely on avoiding a performance paradox by improving the monitoring system. 
However, the distinction between the unintended and deliberate performance paradox of van Thiel 
and Leeuw stresses that side effects do not necessarily occur as a result of conscious misbehavior. 
Side effects might also emerge unnoticed, caused by features of accountability other than high stakes.  
In summary, three conclusions can be drawn with regard to side effects: First, in the debate 
over accountability in education, side effects are attributed to the existence of high stakes. Although 
the degree to which side effects occur might depend on specific implementation features of the 
accountability systems introduced, e.g. high stakes, the existence of side effects may be understood 
more as systematic effects of accountability in education. Second, it seems obvious that the 
corruption of indicators, e.g. “teaching to the test” that results in score inflation, is a substantial 
problem if one strives to raise quality via standards-based testing. Yet, it is less obvious why the 
effects of accountability measures that do not distort indicators, but have consequences for 
educators and educational practice, prove to be problematic for enhancing educational quality as 
well. Taking the corruption of educators into account broadens the view on the problematic effects 
of accountability in education. Third, side effects might not only occur when teachers try to avoid 
accountability pressures. They might also emerge when teachers adapt to measurement demands. 
This emphasizes the point that some side effects emerge because teachers conform to the 
measurement system, and other side effects arise because teachers oppose measurement 
requirements. These considerations suggest the need for a broadened view of accountability side 
effects in education, which takes into account that side effects may not only be a problem that occurs 
when the implementation features of accountability regimes lead to a corruption of indicators that 
teachers employ when trying to avoid pressure. A broadened view has consequences for the study of 
side effects. In the following section, we outline the approach to side effects as applied in the Nefo 
study. 
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Methods 
For the reasons outlined above, we chose to rely on the concept of side effects rather than 
“unintended consequences”, although the project title suggests otherwise. As a working definition, 
we understand the side effects of accountability in education as impacts that are negative or 
ambivalent with respect to efficiency and equity. That is to say, we are not trying to measure 
educational quality itself, but rather to identify potential constraints to a complex process of quality 
development. Whether or not the identified effects do in fact interfere with quality development is 
open to debate. Following this approach, no formal definition of side effects can be employed. 
Instead, to classify effects of accountability measures as side effects, a sound argument has to be 
provided as to how these effects might impact on efficiency and equity. Hence, there is neither a 
definitive list of side effects of accountability in education, nor are phenomena arbitrarily 
characterized as side effects. 
To demonstrate this approach of classifying phenomena as side effects, we refer briefly to a 
phenomenon discussed in the literature as “cream skimming” (Whitty & Power, 2000). In order to 
ensure high test scores in standards-based tests, schools try to recruit high-performing pupils, while 
simultaneously attempting to get rid of pupils with low performance records. From the perspective 
of a school, this can be regarded as a rational behavior. But it is questionable whether this behavior 
really raises the efficiency of a school system, as one cannot be sure that the good test results of 
high-performing schools compensate for those of low-performing schools. Such behavior can also 
be a threat to equity, because social segregation of students might be promoted (Levin, 1998; Moe, 
1995).  
Employing this approach to side effects, two research questions were examined in the Nefo 
study: What kind of side effects can be found in no- and low-stakes contexts and how far are the side 
effects spread in the no- and low-stakes contexts in the four federal states under study? To answer 
these questions, three steps were taken, consisting of (1) an analysis of a variety of policy documents 
in order to describe the accountability regimes of Berlin, Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate and 
Thuringia, (2) an interview study and (3) a survey study. In the following, we briefly sketch out these 
steps.  
The Analysis of Policy Documents 
The four federal states Berlin, Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Thuringia were chosen 
to investigate side effects because prior research indicated that these states differ in the way 
accountability measures were introduced (Döbert, Rürup & Dedering 2008; Rürup 2007). However, 
to get a detailed picture of their accountability measures, a comprehensive analysis of policy 
documents, such as state legislation, publicly accessible information about accountability measures, 
circular letters etc., was conducted. Based on the information collected throughout the documentary 
analysis, a detailed description of the accountability regime in each federal state was prepared. This 
was the basis for developing the footprints for each accountability regime presented in the next 
section.  
It is characteristic of accountability regimes to link bureaucratic and competition-based 
regulation of schools and professional self-control by means of data, such as results of performance 
tests and of school inspections (Bellmann, Schweizer & Thiel, 2016; Thiel, Cortina & Pant, 2014). 
Hence, the focus of the analysis of policy documents laid on the question of whether and how 
evaluation data were integrated into bureaucratic and market-based regulation and professional self-
control in the federal states. For the four states, the emphasis placed on each of the three modes of 
data-driven regulation was rated to be “low”, “medium” or “high”.  
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The emphasis on market-based regulation was rated “high” if a relatively high degree of 
school autonomy could be found in a state, school choice was introduced, and evaluation data were 
made publicly available via a database. If only two of the three measures could be found, the 
emphasis on data-driven market-based regulation was rated “medium” and if only one or none of the 
three measures was found it was rated “low”. There was one exception. If school autonomy is 
evident, as well as school choice, whereas evaluation data are not made publicly available at the 
system level, one cannot speak of data-driven competition. If this was the case, we rated the strength 
of market-based regulation as “low”.  
The strength of data-driven bureaucratic regulation was rated by the number of evaluation 
instruments for whose very procedure it is inherent that the evaluation results are received not only 
by schools, but also discussed with administrators. If three such evaluation instruments could be 
found, the strength was rated “high”, if two instruments were found it was rated “medium”, and if 
only one or no instrument was found, it was rated “low”. Examples for evaluation instruments 
introduced in the four states are performance tests, school inspections and internal evaluation 
instruments. 
In a similar way, the emphasis on professional self-control was rated by the number of 
evaluation instruments that made teachers deal with the results themselves, without being embedded 
in market-based or bureaucratic modes of regulation.  
This approach seemed to be a reasonable way to capture the most crucial differences at the 
“policy level” (Tyack & Cuban, 1995, p. 40) of the four federal states, but there are limitations to 
such an approach. It leads to a rather crude description of accountability regimes, neglecting more 
subtle differences, which might turn out to be crucial in the implementation of data-based regulation, 
e.g. ignoring different degrees of obligations to meet target agreements between administrations and 
schools. In addition, the descriptions do not refer to “policy implementation” (p. 40). It might be the 
case, for instance, that the emphasis on market-based regulation was rated “high”, but in reality, 
there was no effective competition, because the schools are too far apart from each other to be 
actual competitors. 
The comparative design of the study provides a background for the interpretation of results 
of the quantitative study presented below. Accordingly, differences between federal states are traced 
back to differences in the accountability regimes of the four states, although causal relations cannot 
be tested statistically in a cross-sectional study like Nefo. Thus, the explorative approach led to the 
generation of hypotheses concerning factors relevant for the occurrence of accountability side effects 
in education that need to be tested in further research. 
The Interview Study  
An interview study was carried out in the four states under study. Taking the list of side 
effects published by Bellmann and Weiß in 2009 as a starting point, we conducted the interviews to 
explore whether or not the side effects known from the Anglo-American debate on high-stakes 
accountability can also be found in the no- and low-stake contexts of Berlin, Brandenburg, 
Rhineland-Palatinate and Thuringia. In addition, the interview study was undertaken to detect further 
side effects and add them to the list.  
To reduce bias as much as possible, principals and teachers of primary as well as all major 
kinds of secondary schools in the four states were interviewed. In the four states under study, 
primary schools are comprehensive. After leaving primary school, pupils attend usually one out of 
three kinds of secondary schools. They can visit a comprehensive school, a secondary school that 
leads to a grade 10 school leaving certificate qualifying for vocational training, or a Gymnasium that 
leads to a university entrance diploma. We aimed at interviewing the principal and two teachers, one 
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of them actively engaging in school development processes and the other one being uninvolved, of 
three schools per school type in each state. A private school was added to the sample for comparison 
reasons. Unfortunately, it was not possible to reach the intended number of interviews in all cases. 
Table 1 gives an overview over the total number of interviews carried out in the Nefo study. The 
schools were recruited via telephone calls with the school principals. All schools participated 
voluntarily in the study.  
Table 1 
Number of Interviews by Federal State 
 BE BB RP TH 
Primary School 5 9 9 10 
Secondary School up to grade 10 3 9 9 10 
Gymnasium  3 9 13 9 
Comprehensive School  3 0 0 0 
Total  14 27 31 29 
Note. BE = Berlin; BB = Brandenburg; RP = Rhineland-Palatinate; TH=Thuringia. 
 
A total of 101 semi-structured interviews were carried out. For this purpose, an interview 
guide was developed by the project team consisting of rather broad questions concerning how 
accountability measures are perceived and dealt with, and of rather narrow questions concerning 
specific side effects known from the Anglo-American debate.1 The interviews had a length between 
23 and 122 minutes. All the interviews were audio taped.  
In order to answer the research questions central for the interview study, the interviews were 
analyzed by two members of the project team, listening to the audio tapes of the interviews. Their 
task was to write down every occasion in which an interviewee drew a causal relation between 
accountability measures and a phenomenon occurring in everyday school life. Following this step, it 
was discussed by the project team whether or not the identified phenomena could be classified as 
side effects, using the approach outlined at the beginning of this section. As a result, some side 
effects were added to the list presented by Bellmann and Weiß in 2009.  
The Survey Study 
The survey study was based on the extended list of side effects. It was conducted to examine 
the distribution of side effects in the no- and low-stakes contexts of the four states. The IEA Data 
Processing Center (DPC) in Hamburg provided a stratified systematic random sample of 5% of all 
primary schools and 10% of all secondary schools in the four federal states. The sample included 
public as well as private schools. Only special schools for handicapped people were excluded from 
the sampling frame. The DPC provided a sample containing four replacement schools for each 
sampled school. Within the sampled schools, the principals as well as the total of fully certified 
                                                 
1 An English version of the interview guide used in the Nefo study is available at http://www.uni-
muenster.de/EW/en/forschung/projekte/nefo/materialien.html.  
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teachers were supposed to participate in the study. But as schools as well as principals and teachers 
participated voluntarily, it was not possible to ensure that the criteria set in the sampling plan were 
met in all cases. Table 2 presents the participation rates at the school level, at the teacher level 
(including principals and teachers) and the overall participation rate. All participation rates refer to 
participation after including replacement schools.  
 
The participation rates shown in Table 2 seem sufficient to explore the question of whether 
or not side effects pose a substantial problem in no- and low-stakes contexts. However, they do 
suggest that the results are biased to a certain extent, so that conclusions about the precise 
distribution of side effects have to be drawn with caution. The final number of questionnaires 
included in the study is presented in Table 3. A total number of 2637 participants responded to the 
survey. 
 
Two questionnaires were applied in the Nefo study. The core questionnaire, consisting of 
items asking for side effects, was administered to both principals and teachers.2 In addition, a 
complementary questionnaire, containing items asking about school characteristics, was given to the 
school principals. Both questionnaires were developed by the project team. It was intended to cover 
the various side effects presented in Table 4.  
                                                 
2 An English version of the questionnaire used in the Nefo study is available at http://www.uni-
muenster.de/EW/en/forschung/projekte/nefo/materialien.html.  
Table 2 
Participation Rates After Replacement  
 School Participation Rate Teacher Participation Rate  Overall Participation Rate 
BE 64,6% 39,4% 25,7% 
BB 83,3% 50,3% 41,9% 
RP 75,9% 55,8% 42,3% 
TH 83,7% 44,9% 37,6% 
Note. BE = Berlin; BB = Brandenburg; RP = Rhineland-Palatinate; TH=Thuringia.  
Table 3 
Total Number of Questionnaires by Federal State 
 BE BB RP TH 
Principals 26 40 77 42 
Teachers 487 538 954 473 
Total  513 578 1031 515 
Note. BE = Berlin; BB = Brandenburg; RP = Rhineland-Palatinate; TH=Thuringia. 
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Such an approach is of course at the expense of studying individual side effects in depth, but 
seemed suitable for testing the prevailing assumption that side effects do not pose a substantial 
problem in contexts where accountability measures are not linked to high stakes.  
The Accountability Regimes of the Four States under Study 
The documentary analysis has shown that Berlin, Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate and 
Thuringia have shared a shift to accountability measures during the past 15 years. In all states 
performance tests and school inspections were introduced. However, the four states do form a 
contrasting sample concerning the emphasis and interplay of bureaucratic and competition-based 
modes of regulation as well as professional self-control.  
At the level of policy action, the accountability system of Berlin is characterized by a high 
emphasis on market-based and bureaucratic regulation. In Berlin, output data are made available 
through a public data base, schools have relatively high levels of autonomy and parents are free to 
choose their preferred secondary school. Secondary schools are entitled to decide about the 
enrollment of pupils in the case of excess demand. The results of external evaluations like school 
inspections and performance tests as well as the results of internal evaluation procedures are subject 
to target agreements between school administration and schools. In contrast to market-based and 
bureaucratic regulation, little emphasis is placed on professional self-control. Only the results of 
pupils evaluating their teachers serve exclusively as feedback for teachers. These evaluations of 
teachers by pupils are neither part of the bureaucratic control of schools nor part of market-based 
regulation. Figure 1 visualizes the strength of professional self-control, bureaucratic regulation and 







Figure 1. Strength of professional self-control, of bureaucratic regulation and of market-based 
regulation in the accountability regime of Berlin. “10” indicates that the strength of the regulation 
mode was rated “low”, “20” that it was rated “medium” and “30” that it was rated “high”.  
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Brandenburg has introduced the same accountability measures as Berlin during the last 15 
years. Differences between Berlin and Brandenburg occur less at the level of policy action, but might 
be fundamental at the level of policy implementation. It can be assumed that market and competitive 
pressures play a more important role in Berlin, because it is a city state and Brandenburg a territorial 
state. Figure 2 shows the strength of the different modes of regulation in Brandenburg. 
 
 In contrast to Berlin and Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate places considerable emphasis 
on data-based bureaucratic regulation and attributes only a minor role to market-based regulation 
and professional self-control. Subsequent to feedback from external evaluation (like performance 
tests and school inspections) as well as of internal evaluations, schools are obliged to submit target 
agreements to the administration. Market-based regulation is rated “low”, because schools have some 
degree of autonomy and school choice is introduced for secondary schools, but evaluation results are 







Figure 2. Strength of professional self-control, of bureaucratic regulation and of market-based 
regulation in the accountability regime of Brandenburg. “10” indicates that the strength of the 
regulation mode was rated “low”, “20” that it was rated “medium” and “30” that it was rated 
“high”.  
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Compared to the other three federal states, Thuringia places the greatest emphasis on 
professional self-control. The emphasis on professional self-control was rated “medium”, because it 
is left to schools and teachers to deal with evaluation results from performance tests and internal 
evaluations. The strength of bureaucratic regulation as well as market-based regulation was rated 
“low”, because target agreements between administration and schools are only required subsequent 
to school inspections. In Thuringia, schools have only a low degree of school autonomy, school 
choice of secondary schools has not been introduced at a statewide level, and no public data base 
containing output data has been established. Figure 4 displays the strength of the three regulation 








Figure 3. Strength of professional self-control, of bureaucratic regulation and of market-based 
regulation in the accountability regime of Rhineland-Palatinate. “10” indicates that the strength 
of the regulation mode was rated “low”, “20” that it was rated “medium” and “30” that it was 
rated “high”.  
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The analysis of policy documents shows that the accountability regimes of the four states can 
be characterized as either no- or low-stakes contexts. On a scale measuring the degree to which 
gratifications and sanctions are linked to evaluation results from “no stakes” to “high stakes” the 
accountability regimes of Berlin and Brandenburg can be characterized as low-stakes rather than no-
stakes contexts. In Berlin and Brandenburg, it is compulsory to publish evaluation data, so school 
choice can be based on a school’s achievement in performance tests and school inspections. Thus, 
parents’ choices of schools can function as more informal sanctions or gratifications attached to 
evaluation results. In addition, formal sanctions are linked to low performances in school inspections 
in Berlin and Brandenburg. In both states, the period between inspections is shortened if schools are 
judged as being in need of substantial development, and these schools are put under closer 
administrative control. In contrast to Berlin and Brandenburg, no formal sanctions and gratifications 
are bound to evaluation results in Rhineland-Palatinate and Thuringia. Therefore, both states are no-
stakes rather than low-stakes contexts, although evaluation data are subject to target agreements 
between schools and administrators which means, strictly speaking, that evaluation results do not 
serve as “feedback only”. Nevertheless, in comparison to the other three states, the accountability 
regime of Thuringia comes closest to “no stakes” since least emphasis is put on data-based 
administrative control.3  
                                                 
3 After the Nefo study terminated in 2014, substantial changes have occurred in the structure of the 
accountability regime of Thuringia. Since 2015, Thuringia’s school inspection program is temporarily 
suspended. As target agreements were linked to school inspections, data-based administrative control of 
schools does not play any role anymore. At present, evaluation data do exclusively serve as feedback for 






Figure 4. Strength of professional self-control, of bureaucratic regulation and of market-based 
regulation in the accountability regime of Thuringia. “10” indicates that the strength of the 
regulation mode was rated “low”, “20” that it was rated “medium” and “30” that it was rated 
“high”.  
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A List of Side Effects  
As outlined above, the survey in the Nefo project was based on a list containing side effects 
known from the Anglo-American discussion and those detected in the interview study. This list is 
presented in Table 4. It aims to provide a broad overview of the range of identified side effects, but 
it does not claim to be exhaustive.  
Table 4 
List of Side Effects  
I. Side effects on the behavior of teachers and principals 
1. On the level of teaching  
Reallocation I Reallocation of resources between different domains of 
performance 
Reallocation II Reallocation of resources within certain domains of 
performance 
Reallocation III Reallocation of individual support 
Reallocation IV Restricting education to performance- and competence 
considerations 
Coaching I  Preparing for formal peculiarities of tests  
Coaching II Preparing for peculiarities of test items with regard to 
their contents. 
Cheating I  Preparing for a certain upcoming test (‘teaching to the 
test’) 
Cheating II Support and corrections during the test 
Cheating III Subsequent corrections of test items 
Cheating IV Inappropriate grading to improve results 
Myopia Focusing on short-term external requirements 
Ossification Sticking to routinized methods  
Assimilation of teaching I  Adopting a psychometrical test culture for the purpose 
of teaching 
Assimilation of teaching II Focusing on competence indicators instead of long-term 
educational processes (orientation towards output 
instead of orientation towards outcome)  
Assimilation of teaching III Lowering the attainable level of instruction by adjusting 
it to the level of regulated standards 
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Table 4 (Cont’d.) 
List of Side Effects 
2. On the level of schools 
Cream skimming I  Recruiting high performance pupils 
Cream skimming II Expelling weak performers  
Predatory competition instead of 
quality-based competition 
Crowding out schools by poaching pupils 
Test pool selection I Occasionally excluding weak performers from tests  
Test pool selection II Permanently excluding weak performers from tests 
Test pool selection III Additional training and delayed testing of pupils with weak 
performance in preparation for tests 
Inspection pool selection Occasionally excluding poorly performing teachers from school 
inspection 
Mobilization of external 
resources I 
By parents 
Mobilization of external 
resources II 
By private service providers 
Mobilization of external 
resources III 
By the school environment e.g. companies that support the 
school  
Increase of transaction costs I  By documenting a system of accountability (Shifting resources 
away from the core business of instruction) 
Increase of transaction costs II  By increasing advertising (Shifting resources away from the 
core business of instruction) 
Declining quality by shifting 
resources 
Declining quality of teaching by hiring less qualified staff 
Mimetic isomorphism  Adopting ‘legitimate models’ at the level of instruction and 
organization 
Window dressing Optimizing the appearance of the school in short-term 
preparation for school inspections 
Work to rule Restricting activities to the level of set standards 
Hierarchization of the principal-
teacher-relationship 
Monitoring and pressure tend to dominate the principal’s role 
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Table 4 (Cont’d.) 
List of Side Effects 
II. Side effects impacting on the attitudes of teachers and principals  
Effects of deprofessionalization 
I 
Partly delegating teachers’ tasks to experts who are external to 
the profession 
Effects of deprofessionalization 
II 
Allocating tasks to teachers who are external to the profession 
Conflicts with professional 
integrity  
Conflicts between required demands and professional 
educational convictions 
Dependency on expert 
judgements 
Feedback from experts becomes the main criterion for self-
assessment of teachers and their teaching 
Competitive thinking Teachers’ competitive thinking interferes with inner-school 
cooperation 
Change of motivation Increase or decrease of existing motivations through incentives 
Restricted autonomy by 
accountability 
Control is considered to interfere with professional autonomy 
Erosion of trust I  Vote of no confidence by educational policy and 
administration  
Erosion of trust II Distrusting educational policy and administration  
Erosion of trust III Parental distrust 
Erosion of trust IV Distrusting parents and the school environment 
Mental costs Experiencing overextension, stress, fear, frustration, 
uncertainty etc. 
 
Section I of the table contains side effects at the behavioral level of teachers and principals. 
This section is divided into behavioral effects at the teaching level and effects at the school level. 
Section II of the table contains the side effects impacting on teachers’ attitudes. Unfortunately, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to outline the argument underlying the classification of each of the 
listed effects, but most of the side effects listed in Table 1 are well known in the Anglo-American 
debate and therefore need no further explication (Bagley, 2006; Ball, 2003a, 2003b; Finnigan & 
Gross, 2007; Hamilton et al., 2007; Hargreaves & Goodson, 2006; Hursh, 2007; Koretz, 2005; 
Nichols & Berliner, 2007; Popham, 2006; Smith, 1993, 1995; Troman, 2000; Valli & Buese, 2007). At 
this point, we must confine ourselves to elaborating on two phenomena that have been less 
prominent until now, namely the “assimilation of teaching” and “dependency on expert judgement”. 
The reasons why these effects have not yet received much attention may be that they are examples of 
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side effects that occur when teachers conform to the measurement system and that both phenomena 
can be described as the corruption of educators. Until now, a focus on side effects that occur as a 
result of avoiding accountability pressures and a focus on such side effects that can be understood as 
corruption of indicators seems to be prevailing in the discussion.  
“Assimilation of teaching” entails long-term cultural effects on the conduct of teaching. We 
found three different forms: (1) Assimilation of teaching is the case with teachers who use test items 
to teach pupils (Assimilation of teaching I). Proponents of accountability in education might 
consider this a positive effect. In Germany, the Institute for Educational Quality Improvement 
(IQB) maintains a database containing test items that were used in former standards-based tests. The 
database not only contains test items and information on rating answers, but also didactical 
comments for teachers. Notwithstanding, using test items for teaching can be problematic, because 
test items and teaching activities fulfill different requirements. While test items aim at evaluating 
pupils’ competencies, didactical tasks are supposed to initiate learning. Thus, the requirements for 
didactical tasks and test items are inherently different (Benner, 2007; Blömeke, 2009). (2) Another 
form of assimilation of teaching is the alignment of teaching to competence indicators (output) 
instead of orienting teaching to long-term developments (outcome). In the literature, various 
conceptualizations of output and outcome can be found. Here, we follow Chapman (2008) and 
Schreyer (2002) in defining output as the direct and immediate effects of teaching, i.e. student 
performance in terms of skills and competencies. Outcome, on the other hand, refers to the indirect 
long-term effects of schooling, e.g. participation in society (Chapman, 2008; Schreyer, 2002). The 
greater the gap between output and outcome, the greater the risk of tests being mistaken for 
indicators of outcome, instead of output (Shavelson & Huang, 2003). In education, measurable 
output, such as reading literacy, refers to basic skills. Basic skills are no doubt important, but they are 
relevant because they are fundamental to higher aims, such as educating students to think critically 
(Wagner, 1989). (3) When analyzing the interviews, we also found that teachers lowered the 
aspiration level of their teaching in reaction to standards or tests. If this is the case, a class will not 
achieve its full potential performance level. It is obvious that this substantially contradicts aims at 
enhancing quality in education.  
Similar to different forms of “assimilation of teaching”, “dependency on expert judgement” 
is a side effect of accountability in education which mostly goes unnoticed. As Biesta (2015) points 
out, teaching is a practice which cannot be guided by predefined aims and clear-cut rules of action. It 
is a practice which needs to take into account the distinctive features of a pupil or a class. Decisions 
have to be made in accordance with the characteristics of individual cases. If teachers underestimate 
the role of judgement in favor of instructive prescriptions, Schütze (1996) speaks of a ‘professional 
self-misunderstanding’ (p. 237). He stresses that understanding professional practice as a 
technological production process results in inefficiency.  
Both the “assimilation of teaching” and “dependency on expert judgement” are examples of 
side effects that become evident only if one acknowledges that not only evading but also adapting to 
accountability structures constitute problematic effects. The rather explorative comparative, 
quantitative study of the Nefo study gives hints for the explanation of both adaptive behavior 
according to incentives and evasive behavior contrary to incentives.  
Side Effects as Adaptive Behavior (According to Incentives) and           
Evasive Behavior (Contrary to Incentives) 
The quantitative data analysis of our survey revealed that some side effects are commonly 
observed by school teachers, while others are not. Accordingly, side effects can be grouped broadly 
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in two clusters, one containing side effects which are perceived by the majority of teachers in all four 
states, and the second cluster comprising side effects which are reported by the minority of teachers 
in at least one federal state. Asking what the side effects that were observed by most respondents 
have in common, we found that such side effects can be understood as adaptive behavior (according 
to incentives), while side effects, which were reported by the minority of teachers in at least one 
federal state, are forms of evasive behavior (contrary to incentives).  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present results for the variety of side effects studied, 
so we restrict ourselves to the presentation of results for a selection of side effects. Table 5 gives an 
overview of the frequency distribution of the side effects described in the paper.  
Table 5 
Response Rates for Selected Items (cf. text) 













Do you use test items of older 
test booklets in preparation for 
VERA? 
BE 25.1 (0.04) 41.5 (0.04) 19.1 (0.03) 14.3 (0.03) 229 
RP 18.5 (0.03) 40.7 (0.03) 17.8 (0.02) 23.0 (0.03) 498 
TH 26.2 (0.03) 42.5 (0.03) 21.2 (0.03) 10.1 (0.02) 341 
BB* 39.7 (0.03) 42.6 (0.03) 9.2 (0.02) 8.4 (0.02) 325 
Myopia 
I have the impression that 
education has been guided by 
the short-term fulfillment of 
predefined quality measures for 
the past years. 
BE* 27.6 (0.03) 48.0 (0.03) 22.6 (0.02) 1.9 (0.01) 464 
RP* 15.8 (0.01) 54.0 (0.02) 26.4 (0.02) 3.8 (0.01) 923 
TH 11.7 (0.02) 44.1 (0.03) 38.9 (0.03) 5.3 (0.02) 460 
BB* 18.7 (0.02) 52.3 (0.03) 25.0 (0.02) 4.0 (0.01) 532 
Assimilation of Teaching  
I have the impression that the 
orientation towards long-term 
educational processes has taken 
a back seat in recent years.  
BE* 20.9 (0.02) 46.4 (0.03) 30.3 (0.02) 2.4 (0.01) 466 
RP 13.4 (0.01) 42.5 (0.02) 39.2 (0.02) 4.8 (0.01) 933 
TH 11.9 (0.02) 40.4 (0.03) 43.1 (0.03) 4.6 (0.01) 466 
BB* 17.1 (0.02) 48.8 (0.03) 30.3 (0.03) 3.8 (0.01) 528 
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Table 5 (Cont’d.) 
Response Rates for Selected Items (cf. text) 
  Responses 










Individual teachers use the time 
between receiving the test 
booklets and conducting the 
test to practice some of the 
upcoming test items with the 
students. 
BE* 7.0 (0.02) 40.9 (0.03) 28.4 (0.04) 23.7 (0.04) 206 
RP* 7.2 (0.02) 37.5 (0.03) 33.3 (0.03) 22.2 (0.02) 468 
TH 1.2 (0.01) 38.1 (0.03) 30.9 (0.04) 29.8 (0.03) 292 
BB 8.9 (0.02) 39.8 (0.04) 26.2 (0.03) 25.1 (0.04) 292 
Cream Skimming 
Over the past few years, our 
school has increased its efforts 
to avoid accepting pupils with 
poor performance 
BE 5.3 (0.05) 21.1 (0.09) 31.6 (0.11) 42.1 (0.11) 19 
RP 9.6 (0.04) 5.8 (0.03) 25.0 (0.06) 59.6 (0.07) 52 
TH 6.2 (0.04) 0.0 (0.0) 18.8 (0.07) 75.0 (0.08) 32 
BB 6.5 (0.04) 9.7 (0.05) 22.6 (0.08) 61.3 (0.09) 31 
Note. BE = Berlin; RP = Rhineland-Palatinate; TH = Thuringia; BB = Brandenburg; Information in percent; ( ) Standard 
errors in parenthesis; a weighted distribution is presented for “Coaching”, “Myopia”, “Assimilation of Teaching” and 
“Cheating”; an unweighted distribution is presented in the case of “Cream Skimming”; * Statistically significant 
differences compared to Thuringia (p≤0.05); for significance testing, the response categories “agree completely” and 
“agree partly” were combined to one category “agreement” and the response categories “disagree partly” and “disagree 
completely’” were combined to one category ‘disagreement’.  
 
Adaptive Behavior According to Incentives 
Adaptive behavior refers to side effects that might seem unproblematic at first sight because 
accountability itself serves as reference point for teaching practice. There are two ways in which 
accountability stimulates adaptive behavior, one way is that certain forms of behavior are conveyed 
symbolically at the model level, as is the case with Etzioni’s observation that what is measured is 
what matters (1964). Such side effects are essentially systematic effects of accountability of 
education. The second way is less subtle; certain kinds of behavior are communicated to teachers as 
desired behavior at the level of accountability regimes. This is achieved, for example, through the 
decision to establish a database with old test items open to teachers, and is therefore a matter of 
implementation features.  
“Myopia” and “assimilation of teaching” (see Table 4) are examples of the first case. In our 
survey, we asked teachers to agree or disagree with the statement “I have the impression that 
education has been guided by the short-term fulfillment of predefined quality measures for the past 
few years.” 76% of teachers in Berlin, 71% in Brandenburg, 70% in Rhineland-Palatinate and 56% in 
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Thuringia agreed with this statement. 4 At the same time, the majority of teachers in the four states 
reported that the orientation towards long-term educational processes has taken a back seat in recent 
years. 
Other kinds of adaptive behavior can be understood as the teachers’ reaction to 
opportunities that are created actively by policy makers and administrators. “Coaching” with test 
items from recent tests is an example of this. Such coaching is actively promoted in Germany at the 
system level. Not only are old test items made publicly available via the IQB-data base mentioned 
above, but also the use of the data base is actively suggested in official administrative instructions 
(Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Jugend und Wissenschaft, 2013), ministerial circulars (MBJS, 2014) as 
well as some institutional websites, e.g. Berlin-Brandenburg Institute for School Quality 
Improvement (ISQ). In all four federal states, the majority of teachers report preparing for 
standards-based tests with old test items. Eighty-two percent of teachers in Brandenburg report 
using older versions of test booklets to prepare for tests. Fewer teachers report doing so in Thuringia 
(69%), Berlin (67%) and Rhineland-Palatinate (59%). A discussion of the positive and negative 
consequences of coaching for the validity of test results is given by Koretz (2005). Substantive 
coaching that capitalizes on certain aspects of test content may lead to score inflation, while non-
substantive coaching, focusing on arbitrary aspects of test items, may improve validity by removing 
irrelevant barriers to performance. 
Evasive Behavior Contrary to Incentives 
While adaptive behavior was reported by the majority of teachers in our study, only the 
minority of teachers reported such side effects which we termed evasive behavior. Examples at the 
classroom level include violations of regulations in the context of standards-based tests and school 
inspections, as well as coaching in terms of using special preparation booklets, which goes beyond 
actively promoted coaching, as in using old test items to prepare students for tests. At the school 
level, strategies such as “cream skimming”, “test pool selection” and the “exclusion of teachers from 
school inspections” could be attested. In these cases, teachers try to evade accountability pressures 
with strategies that are by no means imposed or desired by proponents of accountability. 
The degree to which teachers agree with items which refer to forms of evasive behavior, 
ranges from relatively high agreement to almost no agreement. For instance, teachers agree with the 
following item: “Individual teachers use the time between receiving the test booklets and conducting 
the test to practice some of the upcoming test items with the students”. 49% of teachers in 
Brandenburg, 48% in Berlin, 45% in Rhineland-Palatinate and 39% in Thuringia agree with the item. 
These forms of “cheating” call the comparability of test results into question, but might promise 
teachers a reasonable way to avoid being blamed for bad test results. With respect to this result, we 
must concede that the test item is rather complex, so that it might be misinterpreted as asking about 
“test preparation” rather than “cheating”.  
Less agreement was reported on the item “Over the past few years, our school has increased 
its efforts to avoid accepting pupils with poor performance.” This item was only administered to 
school principals, 24% in Berlin, 16% in Brandenburg, 15% in Rhineland-Palatinate and 7% of 
principals in Thuringia agreed with the item. Thus, “cream skimming” does not seem to be widely 
spread in the four German federal states, yet it is present even in the context of no and low stakes.  
Almost no agreement was found concerning the item “Sometimes, individual teachers are 
encouraged to stay home on days when the school inspection takes place.” Even though almost no 
teachers agreed with the item, it is still remarkable that – contrary to what we expected – at least a 
                                                 
4 “Agreement” comprises the categories “agree completely” and “agree partly”.  
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small number of teachers in Berlin, Rhineland-Palatinate and Brandenburg did report that individual 
teachers are advised to stay home while a school inspection is conducted. In Thuringia, none of the 
teachers agreed with the item.  
When we look at the response pattern to the variety of items operationalizing evasive 
behavior, it is evident that in almost all cases, teachers in Thuringia report less agreement than 
teachers in Berlin, Brandenburg and Rhineland-Palatinate. Assuming that the reported agreement 
indicates the actual occurrence of side effects, we conclude that evasive behavior is less widespread 
in Thuringia than in the other three states. As stated above, the comparative design of the study 
suggests interpreting this pattern as an effect of the emphasis and interplay between the regulation 
modes of accountability in education, which is specific to each federal state. Thus, it can be argued 
that the accountability-structures in Thuringia stimulate evasive behavior to a lesser degree than the 
accountability-structures of the other three states. In contrast to these states, competition-based and 
bureaucratic pressures play only a minor role in Thuringia. Here, data-based quality management of 
schools is left largely to teachers.  
Conclusions and Outlook 
The findings of the Nefo project reveal that side effects are not bound to high-stakes 
contexts, but that they are also a substantial problem in low- or no-stakes contexts. Notwithstanding, 
a differentiation between adaptive behavior according to incentives, and evasive behavior contrary to 
incentives, must be made. While adaptive behavior is observed by the majority of teachers and 
principals in the no- and low-stakes contexts of Berlin, Brandenburg, Rhineland-Palatinate and 
Thuringia, evasive behavior is not.  
Adaptive behavior may result from the alignment of teaching either to the ideal-type 
accountability model or to specific characteristics of accountability regimes. In the first case, side 
effects are a systematic factor of accountability in education. These side effects occur almost by 
default with the implementation of accountability in education. In the second case, adaptive behavior 
can be understood as an effect of implementation features. The extent to which these side effects 
occur could possibly be reduced by changing the implementation characteristics, but one cannot be 
certain that side effects of this kind would disappear completely after changing the characteristics.  
Compared to adaptive behavior, evasive behavior seems to be more strongly connected with 
implementation characteristics. Accountability regimes with a high degree of market and bureaucratic 
pressure seem to foster evasive behavior. Even under no- and low-stakes conditions, administrative 
and market pressures are exerted on schools, since external actors may base their decisions on the 
results of school evaluations. Administrators may decide to subject a school to closer scrutiny and 
parents might base their choice of school on such evaluation results. It seems reasonable though, to 
assume that the implementation of high stakes intensifies these pressures that are inherent to 
bureaucratic and competition-based regulation.  
Further research is needed to test and modify the findings of the Nefo study. A study 
comparing the distribution of both kinds of side effects — evasive and adaptive behavior — in no- 
and low-stakes contexts and high-stakes contexts could test two central findings of the study: (1) that 
adaptive behavior, that is, the assimilation of teaching, is foremost a systematic problem of 
accountability in education and therefore not necessarily a matter of specific implementation 
features; and (2) that evasive behavior increases with growing pressure on schools and educators.  
Irrespective of how future research might turn out, the Nefo project indicates that a 
broadened view of side effects can yield a deeper understanding of the problematic effects of 
accountability in education. However, in order to reach that point, some well-established truths will 
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have to be called into question. This is true both for research on accountability in education in high-
stakes contexts, and for research on educational accountability in low-stakes or no-stakes contexts. 
With regard to the former line of research, evidence from the Nefo project could problematize a 
widespread one-sided concentration on high stakes as the alleged major problem of accountability in 
education. Although it is understandable that high stakes have become a primary concern for both 
educators and researchers in many English-speaking countries, it might be important to note that 
high stakes, as a contingent implementation characteristic of accountability in education, are not the 
only problem in the context of side effects. Countries with a low-stakes or no-stakes version of 
accountability in education should by no means be treated as if they were the promised land of 
education policy.  
With regard to the latter line of research, evidence from the Nefo project could also 
problematize a widespread one-sided concentration on allegedly inadequate reactions of teachers to 
accountability instruments. When teachers do use data from standards-based tests and school 
inspections, as they are supposed to, but in fact produce a wide range of side effects even in contexts 
of no stakes or low stakes, the common practice of continually blaming teachers for their 
incompetence or resistance to instruments that are flagged as “feedback only”, is barely convincing. 
Furthermore, countries with a high-stakes version of accountability in education should not serve as 
a “cautionary tale” to eliminate concerns about the side effects of accountability in education in 
general. Both lines of research can use evidence from the Nefo project as an opportunity to 
investigate the side effects of accountability in education as systematic effects of indicator-based 
regimes of quality assessment and assurance — irrespective of whether or not there are really high 
stakes. 
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